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Chapter IV 
The Mechanisms for. Containing Imports: The System during 1971 and 
A Retrospective Loot at its Evolution 
(Ta.riffs, Prior Deposits and the Exchange Rate)* 
In Chapter II an 11 import function n, based on historical data, was 
derived, emphasizing the power of authorities to limit imports according to 
foreign exchange availabilities. This chapter will start taking a closer 
look at the different mechanisms used specifically to contain imports. Those 
mechanisms have been mainly four: the tariff, import deposits, the exchange 
rate applicable to imports, and import licensing. ITaturally, the manipulation 
of other more general policy variables, such as credit, have also been influenced 
by a desire to limit ex-ante import demand, but this chapter will concentrate 
on the first three specific import~repressing mechanisms, treating the fourth 
in a separate chapter. 
Since The Great Depression, it has been the typi·~al assumption of Colombian 
policy-makers that tLe dollar value of the g_uantity of imports demanded by 
Colombians would exceed the foreign exchange available to finance those 
imports. At the exchange rates, tariffs and other import charges which pre­
vailed during most of the period, this was indeed the case, so that available 
foreign exchange ended up being rationed, in addition to the instruments already 
mentioned, ·by a system of import licensing. The burden carried by each of 
the import-repressing or rationing mechanisms, as the authorities struggled 
to bring the demand for imports into line with exchange availabilities, 
changed from year to year, and there has been a constantly fluctuating 
mix of those four instruments in use throughout post war II. In retrospect, 
the authorities appear to have had a vague desire that no single instrument 
should bear an ·· 1excessive;; burden in the task of re:pressinr; imports. In other 
words, when pressure on licensing authorities became great, i.e., when 
delays and rejections of import and exchange license requests were above 
their average historical level, there was a tendency to devalue the import 
exchange rate, or to raise tariffs and surcharges, or to increase prior 
import deposits. On the other hand, if the exchange rate was considered 
adequate, surges in im-9ort demand tended to be met by tighter licensing 
procedures, higher duties, etc. 
Much of this balancing among instruments was done nb:, ear", and in 
different ways as among types of imports, so that it is very difficult to 
trace historically with precision the exact import-repressing weight carried 
by each polic;sr in a given year. It is clear, however, that the ultimate 
weapon, not always brought into play at the opportune time, was import and 
exchange licensing, based, in turn, on the actual a:n.d expected exchange 
availability. It is also clear that in practically all years under study 
(1950 through 1970), the import and exchange controls had a bite, in the 
sense that the exchange rate, tariffs a.11.d import c.eposi ts left an ex-ante 
demand for imports higher than what the authorities thought could be financed. 
The reasons given in Colombia for relying on several import-repressing 
mechanisms rather than just on one (e.g., the exchange rate, perhaps coupled 
with a uniform across-the-board tariff) are several. The most interesting 
rely on the instability of world coffee market, end the Colombian burden 
Consider, for the sake of simplicity,of adjusting to that exogenous fact. 
just a non-coffee exchange rate, assumed to be flexible, and licenses. 
Wi thou;t a licensing mechanism and. with doir:estic "full employment
II policies, 
a sudden and unexpected drop in world coffee prices will, ceteris paribus, 
lead to a devaluation. It is argued t'h.at even in the medium run, price 
elasticities are such that the exchange rate would have to fluctuate as 
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much as world coffee prices, and that such instability would not only 
have unfavorable resource allocation a...~d welfare effects, but also impart 
an inflationary bias to the economy. Sudden increases in the world coffee 
price would also have disruptive effects, although not perfectly symmetrical 
with those following coffee price declines. Larger Colombian foreign exchange 
reserves would be an alternative to a totally flexi,Jle excha11ge rate~ but 
it is argued that import and exchange licensing is a cheaper way of tackling 
the problem. The possibility that either domestic or foreign stabilizing 
speculators would take up the burden of offsetting coffee price gyrations 
is not taken very sel'iously (with good reason). 
Note that in this argument import and exchange licensing are closely 
interlinked, a lf,sson pe.inf'nlly leR.rn?.<'l <'luring 1956-58. Granting import 
licenses freely and holding back later on permits to bu:r foreign exchange 
obviously lead to a :piling up of commercial e..rrears, and to the transformation 
of private debts to suppliers into part of the national foreign debt, as 
the externe.l credit of the country becomes damaged by payment delays and 
pressure is exerted by foreign creditors on Colombian authorities. There 
are, of course, other reasons for maintaining exchange controls, particularly 
to regulate the capital account of the Balance of Payments, and also some 
service items in the current account (e.g. 9 profit and royalty remittances, 
tourism, etc.). 
Furthermore, there is in Colombia, as elsewhere 9 skepticism regarding 
the ability of prices to regule,te qua:.r'J.ti ties demanded; in particular, the 
long duration of import controls and ill-fated brief liberalization attempts, 
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have generated the myth of an irrepressible import and exchange demand, 
which cannot be curbed short of extravagant prices. 
The arguments for tariffs, not always consistent with those given 
above, are those found elsewhere. Nobody nowadays seems willing to defend 
prior import deposits in principle; as with the Vietnam war, it is alleged 
that no one is q_ui te sure why they got started, and that the problem is 
how to wind them down without harming other targets, such as monetary 
stability. 
This chapter and next will go into some detail into the mechanics 
of the different import-restraining :policy instruments, particularly 
import licensing. Emphasis will be placed on how they operated circa 1971, 
with retrospective glances whenever data warrant them. These two chapters 
will be heavy on description, leaving a good cho,re of the discussion on 
the effects of these pol.icy instruments on resource allocation, growth, 
income distribution rind employment to the last chanter. 
The Tariff 
The universal debate between protectionists and free-traders took 
Colombian root quite early in the nineteenth century, and has never been 
2
resolved (as elsewhere). Historically, transport costs from the Colombian 
coasts to its central highlands, where most of the population lives, have 
been high, proyiding a significant (but declining) natural protection. To 
this, the tariff has added further protection of a variable magnitude. 
It has been argued that the primary function of the Colombian tariff 
during the 1920s was to provide the central government with revenue. 
3 
A completely new tariff schedule was adopted in 1931, using as a partial 
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justification balance of ~ayrnents considerations. David Chu has found 
that although Colombian nominal tariffs rose, the median level of effective 
protection fell slightly, from 19 to 17 percent, in ad-valorem equivalents, 
for a sample of non-traditional. industries between 1927 and 1936. The 
ranking of industries according to effective protection also changed little 
between those two dates. The average of nominal tariff rates for all imports 
was 23 percent in 1927, 25 percent in 1936 and 15 percent in 1945. During 
the second world war years the 1931 tariff modifications, based on specific 
taxes, became less effective, and multiple exchai-1ge rates were introduced 
in part as an alternative to tariffs. 
Major revisions of the tariff schedule took place again in 1951 and in 
4
May 1959, both of which are regarded as protectionist in intent. Average 
nominal duties, in ad valorem eq_uivalents, for items not in the prohibited 
list, were 17 percent in the 1951-59 tariff and 48 percent in the tariff 
of May 1959. The tariff increase was greater for manufactured consumer 
goods, going from 18 to :i 3 percent in ad-valorem equivalents, than for 
intermediate inputs into industry, which went from 22 to 40 percent. The 
tariff at both dates included specific as well as ad-valorem duties; as 
late as 1962, 30 percent of the value of assessed tariffs came from specific 
duties. 5 
In December 1964, a new Tariff schedule was decreed, adopting the Brussels 
nomenclature and containing only ad-valorem duties. However, since that 
date, and acting under snecial powers, the 3:overnment introduced a bewildering 
number of changes in the Tariff, particularly during the import liberalization 
episode of 1965-66, anc. again during 1968 through 1971. l1axiy items have 
seen their duty rates changed several times "between 1964 and 1971, under special 
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laws by which Congress granted the Executive, or the latter assumed, the 
power to carry out those changes without Congressional approval, but for 
limited periods of time. Just between January 1965 and December 1966, it is 
estimated that nearly one thousand tariffs were changed (mostly increases); 
there were also temporary surcharges, for 3 or 4 years, on many consumer 
goods and even on intermeo.iate and. capital goods, aimed at smoothing the 
liberalization process. '::.'he Executive povers to carry out such changes 
without Congressional approval became extinguished in 1971, but the government 
quickly requested from Congress a ~1ew general law al.lowing for frequent 
(although limited) rate changes. 
A first attempt at systematic quantification of the impact of the 
Tariff is presented in Table IV-1 showing the de f2.cto "average tariff
11 
and the share of central government tax revenues accou..n.ted for by collected 
duties, during 1943 through 1970. 'I'he most striking fact emerging from 
this table is the repeated pattern of gradual declines followed by abrupt 
increases in both percentages, without an obvious overall trend for the 
whole period. The abrupt increases {:'._n 1<;·51, 1959-60, and 1965-66) coincide 
with tariff reforms. 
The evolution of collected duties as a percentage of import values 
( the II average tariff,;) during 1951 through 1970 can be explained statistically 
quite well as a function not only of years elapsed since the last tariff 
Reform, but also of import level and composition. The best results of 
attempts at explanation are presented in Table IV-2. It can be argued that, 
once adjustment is made for years elapsed. since the last tariff Reform, as 
indicated by the always significant dummy, increases in the a average tariff" 
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Table IV-1 
Import Duties Collected as Percentages of Peso Value of Merchandise Imports 2 
and of Central Government Tax Revenues, 1943-1970 
Duties Relative Duties Relative to 
to Imports Central Government 
Tax Revenues 
1943 14.8 26.1 
1944 14.9 24.4 
29.21945 14.7 
1946 12.2 27.2 
26.11947 10.3 
1948 10.0 20.8 
1949 8.3 13.5 
21.21950 12.7 
36.81951 21.8 
1952 18.9 32.1 
1953 18.3 35.7 
1954 20.0 36.9 
1955 16.1 25.8 
1956 13. )~. 20.6 
1957 8.7 17.7 
1958 6.9 13.5 
1959 12.8 22.4 
1960 16.6 29.2 
1961 15.1 28.2 
.. ,.../n ., L , -,r:. n 
C-V•/J.;IOC: .J..Lt. J... 
1963 12.6 19.2 
1964 12. 7 16.7 
1965 15.0 15.9 
1966 22.5 31.9 
1967 15.1 15.2 
1968 13.0 15,9 
1969 14.2 15,5 
1970 15.3 19.0 
Sources and Method: Basic data obtained from DANE-AGDE, several issues, 
and BdlR-RdBdlR, several issues. 
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reflect import liberalization. Thus, there is a significant and positive 
link between the average tariff and the level of imports whether measured 
in absolute or relative terms. Significant links also exist with the share 
of consumer goods in the import bill (positive, as these goods are taxed 
higher than average) and with that for capital goods (negative, as these 
goods are truced below average). No such links were fou..11.d with the share 
for raw materials and intermediate pr.oducts. The negative trend of the 
first equation in Table IV-2 can then be said to reflect both the gradual 
decline in the share of consumer goods in the import bill as well as the 
increase in that for capital goods. These conclusions are also supported 
by a regression, not shown~ making the average tariff a function of the shares 
of consumer, intermediate e.,H3_ capital goods in the import bill, without 
a constant term. Tl1.e implied "average tariffs n for each of those groups 
according to this regression~ are 72, 10 and 7 percent respectively. But 
only the coefficient for the share of consumer goods has at-statistic larger 
than two. 
At first glance, it may be thought that the gradual erosion in tariff 
revenues following reforms may be due to the presence of specific duties 
within a world wide inflationary setting; the pattern, however, has been 
present even following the 1965 conversion of all duties into ad valorem 
rates. The predicted values for recent years from equations (1), (4) and (5) 








1965 15.0 16.6 15.1 14.3 























Regressions nExplaininrt Irr.rport Duties Collected as Percentages of Peso Value 
of' IIerchandise Imports, 1951-70 
(2) ( 3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant 11.10 8.70 19.64 5.19 12.65 5.28 
(5,5) (3.7) (4.8) (2.2) (6.o) (2.1) 
Dummy for 
Tariff Reform - -l. 59 -1.48 -1.67 -0.97 -0.89 -1.28 -0.91 
(7.5) (6. 5) (6.9) (4.9) (4.7) (5.1) (4.6) 
Absolute 
Import Level 0.021 0.011 0.020 
(5.1) (2.6) (4.3) 
Relative 






in Imports o.45 0.24 0.60 
(2.8) (1. 5) (3.4) 
Share of 
Capital Goods 
in Iil1port s -0.26 n 1 '.)-v • ..J....J 
(2.3) (1. 7) 
R2 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.85 o.86 0.70 o.83 
F-test 23.5 20.3 ir.1 30,9 31.7 20.2 41.8 
DW 1.9 2.3 1.5 1.5 1.2 2.4 1.2 
Sources and Method: Basic data as in Table IV--1 and Ta-ble II-4 (BdlR). The dummy 
for Tariff Reform was giveE the following values: 
1951 = 0 1961 = 2. 5 
1952 = 1 1962 = 3-5 
1953 = 2 1963 = 4.5 
1954 = 3 1964 = 5.5 
1955 = 4 1965 = O 
1956 = 5 1s66 == 1 
1957 = 6 196'"?' := 2 
1958 == 7 ::~Se = 3 
1959 = 0.5 1969 = 4 
1960 = 1.5 197'.) = 5 
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refers to total merchandise imports, 




11 Relative Import Level,; refers to a giv
en year's total imports
dollars. 
divided by the average imports during
 the previous two years. Average valu
es 
for the variables were as follows : 
Collected duties as percentage of imp
orts 15.2
559.2
Absolute import level 108.2
Relative import level 10.7
Share of consumer goods in imports 40.3
Share of capital goods in imports 3,1
Dummy for Tariff Reform 
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It may be noted tnat the unusually high tariff revenues in 1966 are 
generally credited to the larger imports of heavily taxed automobiles. 
A more plausible and general explanation for the power of the dummy 
in Table IV-2 is the tendency for tariff reform to involve, for fiscal reasons, 
an increase in the rates charged to intermediate 8nd capital goods, plus 
those on a few luxury consumer durables, as well as a tightening of loopholes 
and abolition of ad-hoc exemptions. As on balance these measures, favored 
by the Treasury, lower the effective protective rates for most existing 
industries (as in most cases direct competitors are kept out by prohibitions 
and the licensing mechanism), the reform faces shortly after its inception 
a relentless gnawing by special interests, ,:rho seek lower input rates and 
exemptions, until that process goes so far as to arouse fresh demands for 
tariff reforms. 
Table Iv... 3 s::iows the extent of exemptions from import duties shortly 
after the tariff reform of December 1964. In the key categories of other 
intermediate and capital goods, maki.ng up :1.early 60 percent of all imports, 
the gradual expansion of ex.em-;itions can be seen. Besides the nPlan Vallejo11 , 
discussed in Chapter III, other total or partial exemptions include those 
relating to imports from Andean and other LAFTA sources, those for 11basic 
industries 11 (e.g. sulphur; pig iron, coal, chemical :pulp, fishing, etc.), 
some imports for the public sector, imports financed with AID credits, plus 
other ad-hoc exemptions. These are not always automatic; many require applications 
subject to review and approval. By 1967, 30 percent of all imports were 
exempted from duties; more than half of those of capital goods paid zero 




Relations .Among Duties Collected, Dutiable Imports and All Imports, 1965 through 1967 
Tariff Collections as Dutiable Imports as Average Share 
Percentages of Dutiable Percentages of All of Each 
Imports in Each Category Imports in Each Category in 
Categories Category All Imports 
Categories 1965 1966 1967 1965 1966 1967 1965-67 
2.2Automobiles 228 51 85 71 71 71 
Other Consumer Goods 28 28 24 81 84 70 3.4 
4.2Foodstuffs 20 10 17 99 9 22 
Other Raw Materials 14 15 17 100 100 100 4.1 
Intermediate Goods 
for Agriculture 3 13 6 99 100 100 2.0 
Other Intermediate Goods 17 25 24 93 93 88 34.o 
Transportation Equipment 23 42 27 90 85 74 6.o 
CapitaJ. Goods 
for Agriculture 3 8 5 80 82 78 3.1 
Other Capital Goods 17 13 :6 61 57 48 24.8 
20 49 12 62 87 6~ 16.2Unclassified 
Total 19 28 22 79 79 70 100.0 
/ 
Sources and Method: Unpublished estimates of DANE and Contraloria. 
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Other tariff loopholes arise from the practice of levying different 
rates for the same product. depending on its fina,l use. For example, an 
automobile which allegedly is to be used as a taxi ( npublic service''') will 
pay a much lower duty than an identical car imported for private use, 
explaining why one finds cars painted as taxis which do not seem to stop 
for any customer. That practice also lends itself to the setting up of 
special tariff sub-categories benefitting powerful interests; the knowledgeable 
can tell why input X bears a tariff of only 10 percent if used in producing 
product Y, while bearing one of 50 percent "for other industries n. Clearly, 
the tariff is not a purely independent variable in the Colombian socio­
economic system. 
To obtain a more detailed, and yet manageable? view of the Colombian 
sample of 125 importanttariff structure as it stood in 1971, the rates for a 
6 
have been analyzed.products, first chosen for 1962 by Santiago Ifacario, 
This will allow us, inter alia:i to examine net changes occurring between 
1962 and 1971. The regime to which each of the products is and was subjected 
in the import control mechanism, e.g., whether the product is placed on the 
free, prior license or prohibited list, was noted. Finally, the prior 
deposit relevant for each product in 1971 was also recorded. This information 
is summarized in Table IV-4; note that it is based on rates and information 
read off the tariff books, so that it refers to non-exempt items. 
Consider first the tariff as it stood in 1971, The rates, on the whole, 
look quite nreasonable 11 , particularly for i terns not in the prohibited list. 
There are few extravagantly high duties. As shown in Table III-7, however, 
the tariff schedule by itself is capable of generating very high ERP's, 
which fluctuate a good deal among activities. It may be seen in Table IV-4 
-9a-
Table IV-4 
Colombian Duties and Other Restrictions on Selected (non-exe!11pt) Imported Prod
ucts 
from non-LAFTA Sources, 1962 and 1971 
Ad Valcrem Ad Valorem Number of items in 
duties, in pri_or deposits~ the group subject to 
percentages in percentages, each regime 
1971 1962 in 1971 
Unprocessed foodstuffs 60 185 99 
-Prohibited 76 272 130 8 
-Previous license 35 23 50 5 
4
8 
-Free List 145 0 
1 
72Industrial raw materials 21 37
44 .68 130 1 3-Prohibited 3
-Previous license 20 20 66 9
0 4
-Free List 27 
Capital goods 26 19 35 
0 1
-Prohibited 30 
43 22 12-Previous license 23 26 6 15
-Free List 36 12 9 
Semi-manufactured products 
{including processed fuels), 
other than products of 
69traditional industries 29 30 
130 2 1-Prohibited 34 200 26 14
-Previous license 28 30 62 4 17
-Free List 32 20 89 
Processed foodstuffs 103 359 111 8 10
-Prohibited 111 426 120 
-Previous license 94 218 97 6 3 0 1
-Free List 250 
Durable consumer goods 76 114 93 4
-Prohibited 84 114 100 110 6
-Previous license 75 93 92 
0 1
-Free List 175 
Other current consumer goods 
{including semi-manufactured 
products of traditional 
99 102industries) 5 10-Prohibited 180 130 
-Previous li~ense 65 44 93 11 
4 
66 1 3-Free List 54 37 
Total 53 107 76 
-Prohibited 104 265 125 25 3746
-Previous license 41 49 66 89 
43 11 42-Free List 36 31 
-9b-
Table IV-4 (continued) 
S,ources and Method: Data for 1962, as well as the classification scheme and 
product list, were obtained from Santiago I1acario, nProtectionism and 
Industrialization in Latin .America", Economic Bulletin for Latin P.merica, 
Vol. IX, No. 1, M:arch 1964, pp. 61-101 (United Nations). Data for 1971 
obtained from Republica de Colombia, Arancel de Aduanas (Editor, Alfonso 
Valderrama A. ) . 
Figures for each category, as well as for the total, represent simple 
arithmetic averages. 1·Jhen an item (say, forklifts) had been subdivided into 
various classes, each with its own duty or prior deposit, (sometimes depending 
not on the nature of the product, but on its final use) again a simple average 
was taken. The predominent regime was usually taken for each item; in cases 
of doubt, the more liberal regime was used as representative. 
Import duties include, besides the standard tariff ad valorem rates, 
consular fees and across-the-board. surcharges. During 1971 these were as 
follows: 
~ trfConsular fees: J.7o ad valorem 
Surcharge to finance PROEXPO: 1 .1/2% ad valorem 
Surcharge for Coffee Fund: 11/2% ad valorem 
Total 4% ad valorem 
(Promotion laws, of course, exempt many imports from all duties. This is 
not taken into account in the table.) 
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that duties on industrial raw materia'.1.s, capital goods and semi-manufactured 
products were substantially lower than those for processed foodstuffs 
and all kinds of consumer goods. 'l'he average duties for industrial 
raw materials and capital goods on the p:cevious license list are 20-23 percent, 
a level which is unlikely to, at best, exceed by much the degree of 
overvaluation of the peso. 
When one averages the duties in 1971 for the 367 items which make 
up Chapter 84 of the Colombian tariff (ran-electrical machinery), the 
simple mean obtained, 27 percent, is similar to that in the sample. The 
corresponding figure for the 161 items of Chapter 85 (electrical machinery) 
is somewhat higher, 38 -percent. 
Francisco TLoumi has called attention to another feature of the tariff 
which frequently makes it more protect:.onist tha,.'1 it appears at first sight, 
and always more distortiw~, involving the tree.tment of used goods, particularly 
used durable consumer goods. ~:hus, many second-hand goods are supposed to be 
valued when imported as if they were new, on the feeble grounds that otherwise 
valuation would be difficult to ascertain exactly, which, it is alleged, would 
open the door to all sorts of 
11 irregularitiesi'. The tariff legislation explicitly 
states, for example, that used automobiles are to be valued at the prices those 
'1-:lhen these regulations
vehicles had when they cro11e off fresh :from 
the factory. 
are applied to capital goods not produced i
n Colombia, they tend to reduce 
the effective protec,tion given to their use
rs, while dis::::ouragi;,1g a more 
efficient use of t:he nation 
I s foreign exchange availabilities ( and prob
ably 
of its labor force also). 
Duties on capital goods in the f:i:•ee li s-::, exce
ed clearJ.y those for 
capital goods under the pr,~vious license re
gine, but th2 corresponding gap 
is narrower for se::ni-finist.ed products. 'Ihe:re a
:9pears to be at 1east two 
conflicting considerat:.ons in establish_~ng 
intera,ctions between tariffs and 
import controls; on the or;e hand 
1'essent.:;_als i; tend. to be treated more softly
 
by both instruments, while ;;luxuries" are :
;;m:nished -by both, as witnessed by 
the redundant high duties on items in the p
roh5_bite:l lis-c- On the other 
hand, some attempts haYe -,:.,een made, particu
larly during 196,~66, to raise 
tariffs on items in tl1e free list and t:1ose
 t:,::ansfe1•rt;d .f'rom previous license 
to the free list) consciously c:o:)r6.ins.tircg the u
se of both -s,3,rilfs and import 
controls_ 'T'nile -'.;:i_1at coordinatirn.: is assJ_r
ed or. paper, t,he ::s.ct that two 
different bu:,:'e&,ucra:C:_c oYgcmiza·:~j ons decide
 on tc.riffs and import control 
regimes, respective1y, me<ms de _fact_£ that e
xcC:pt d:uring y,,,,.; (~els of major 
policy changes, w:h.en high 3,uthor:Lties are ,,ery 
consc:.ous of th"~s issue, each 
policy variab:i._e is handled without mi.:ct regard 
to 1:.ow ·che ot:1er is being 
manipulated. 
As a member oi' thE- .A:.1dean Comrf.on Viarket, Co
lomb:La has agreed to bring 
its tariff schedule in Ure with the 1'Lie:-,n Mi
nimum Cow1non External Tariff 
(AMCET) by 1975 2nd ac.opt -she _L\r:deen Ccrnmon rxtcrn::,.-!_ 
'l'a::iff (ACET) by 1980. 
The .A.MCET ar;ree~ up.-:m by the me,,,.,_lJ~r ~0u:,_--:i-trieos in
 Decemo,=r 1970 is in fact 
fairly close to L1e t:;o:::.o::nbi3.n wa:c::_ff' sc'::.edu_
i_e:, ·br!:t with a l0we:~ average tariff 
7 
::,:_t, _i_,; far fTorn clear, however, what the
and less uneq1J.2.l :rate2 (less sp:c·r~ac .l .. 
final AGS"2, to be 
-lla-
'l'able IV-5 
Average Ad Valorem Duties in 1962 and 1971 of Selected Imported Products 
According to Their Level of Duties in 1972 
i'lumber of Average Average Number of 
Items in Duty iD Duty for Items in 
1962 1962 Same Items Each Rank 
1962 Duties in 1971 in 1971 
100% and higher 39 280 97 18 
From 70 to 99% 11 79 57 5 
From 40 to 69% 13 47 41 30 
From 20 to 39% 26 26 32 44 
From Zero to 19% 37 7 20 29 
Sources and Hethod: As in Table IV-4. 
-12-
The net changes in the tariff between 1962 and 1971, according to 
Table IV-4, may be surri..mari zed as follows: a lowering of average rates, 
mainly by the reduction of very high rates for items in the prohibited list, 
and a narrowing of the spread of duties, not only by the elimination of 
e.xtravagantl~r high ones, but also by the increase of very low ones. This 
may be seen more clearly in Table IV-5; items which in 1962 had duties higher 
than 39 percent, by 1971 had seen their duties reduced, on average, while those 
having 1962 tariffs lower than 40 percent vitnessed, on the whole, increments. 
These changes are most dramatic among goods which in 1962 had duties 
above 99 percent and below 20 percent. By 1971, of the total sampled items, 
59 percent had duties within the 20 to 70 percent range; in 1962 that percentage 
was only 31 percent. Table IV-6 complements this information, showing the 
the most arithmetically significant tariff cuts occurring among items which 
both in 1962 and 
1 
71 were in the prohibited list, and to a lesser extent among 
those transferred from the 1962 prohibited Est to the 1971 previous license 
list. The few items which in 1971 remained in the free list had duties higher 
than those they paid in 1962; the increment is most noteworthy in those godds 
which were in the free list both in 1962 and 1971. 
The trend between 1962 and 1971, then, has been toward the rationalization 
of the tariff, and a diminution of its distorting effects. Although far from 
most economists' ideal, the tariff in 1971 was probably one of the most sensible 
among LDC' s tariffs. The changes of the last decade, furthermore, leave Colombia 
irith a tariff schedule which would require relatively few changes if one fine 
day import controls were abolished, particularly if ad-hoc tariff exemptions 
8 
were also eliminated. 
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Table IV-6 
Changes in Regime and Average Duties between 1962 a..'1d 1971 for Selected Imported Products 
Regime in Regime in Number of Average Average 
1962 1971 Items Ad Valorem Ad Valorem 
Duty in 1962 Duty in 1971 
(Percentages) (Percentages) 
Free List Free List 5 8 24 
Free List Previous License 36 32 32 
Free List Prohibited 1 88 24 
Previous License Free List 6 42 45 
Previous License Previous License 40 46 38 
Previous License Prohibited. 0 
Prohibited Free List 0 
Prohibited Previous License 13 137 73 
Prohibited Prohibited 24 334 100 
Total 122_ 107 53 
Sources and Method: As in Table IV-L!-. 
... 
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It should be added that the Colombian sales tax aJ.so contains protectionist 
elements, as its rates bear more heavily on imports than on domestic production 
for a (small) num~er of commoditiess such as alcoholic beverages, canned 
goods and clothing. 'I'he ,;Musgrave Report 11 recommended abolishing the use 
of the sales tax as a supplementary instrument of protection, as well as 
a better coordination of tariffs with luxury taxation, but as with most of 
its recommendations, Congress has failed to act as of 1971.9 Indeed, during 
December 1970 Congress levied a heavy sales/consumption tax on foreign cigarettes, 
which led to a drying up of registered imports of those goods, to a dramatic 
increase in contraband, which became a subject of scandalized public discussion 
during August/September 1971. 1
0 
.Another institutional fact of some interest refers to the freq_uent 
complaints of law-abiding importers regarding the actual management of some 
customs, which allegedly impose not only normal tariff burdens on some, but 
al.so costly delays and petty nuisances; while freeing luckier or less scrupulous 
importers from their taxes. Even with the best will confusion can arise over 
product specification, but it is not unusual for an importer to face a hostile 
stance from custom officials. Furthermore, warehouses and other facilities 
. j t . d t b . b . d . 1 ll These circum-in ma or por s are sai o e in poor s,ape, in ucing osses. 
stances, of course, are also widespread in other countries, and are hardly 
unique Colombian features. 
Prior Import Deposits 
Before an importer can even apply to obtain the necessary import license, 
he must deposit with the Banco de la Republica a given amount, expressed 
as a percentage of import values, which must remain deposited, earning no interest 
and eroded by inflation) until some time after the merchandise in question clears 
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Colombian customs. The advance der:.osi t is ca~_culated at present on the 
f.o.b. value of impor-~s, at the average exchar.,ge rate for the previous month. 
The time which elapses between dq,osit and its return has varied from 
period to period; it was about 6 or 8 mont:1s during 1964, with free list 
imports typically involving shorter deposit periods than those approved under 
EarUer~ in 1963, import deposits were sterilizedthe previous license regime. 
for an average of 10 months. Du.ring 1958 the lag began to be deliberately 
stretched, with a decree stating that deposits would not be returned to 
the importer until 60 days after the goods had reached a Colombian port. 
By 1966 the corresponding figure was estimated at 9 months. More recently, 
the lag averages roughly 7 or 8 months. 
Beginning in 1964, advance dep:::;sits have al.so been required for obtaining 
the foreign exchange needed to pay for the imports, once they have cleared 
customs. The advance payments deposit must be equivalent to 95 percent of 
,, 
the import value, and must be placed with the Banco d.e la Republica at least 
20 days prior to t~e issuance of the exchange license needed to obtain the 
foreign currency. 
Prior deposits were originally introduced as one more mechanism to repress 
imports? but their increased. use during the balance of payments troubles 
of the second half of the nineteen fifties, particularly since mid-1957, turned 
them into a critical tool of monetary policy. 3y 1960? as it may be seen 
in Table IV-7, the stock of inport deposits rea.ched 24 percent of the import 
flow for that year, a.'1d 16 percent of the stock of total domestic credit 
At least since that time, prior deposits( and 22 :perce~1t of the money supply). 
became a widely disliked. institution, by bot:.: l)usinessmen and policy-makers. 
Only the weakness of more cr·~hodox monet.a:ry tools, such as reserve requirements 
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Table IV-7 






















Sources and Method: 













































Data for prior import deposits and for domestic credit 
refer to average stocks during the year. The former were obtained from 
, 
Alberto Roque Musalem, Dinero, Inflacion y Balanza de Pagos: La Experiencia 
de Colombia en la Post-Guerra (Bogota~ Colombia: Talleres Graficos del 
Banco de la Republica~ 1971), p. 153; and from BdlR-RdBdlR, several issues. 
Peso values for imports and total domestic credit obtained from IMF-IFS. 
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and red.is counting, arising from the power of cow.mercial banks a.nd some 
other private groups, such as the Coffee Federation, vis-1-vis the Central 
Bank, assured the continuation of the use of prior deposits. Nevertheless, 
the importance of prior deposits has been declining, on the whole, since 
1960, although that trend has not been smooth. 
As a tool of monetary policy, prior import deposits are clumsy and 
inflexible, and can lead to serious conflict between the goals of import 
liberalization and monetary stability. For example, the reductions in prior 
deposit rates adopted beginning in October 1965, as part of the import 
liberalization program, resulted, with a lag, in an undesired increase in the 
money supply, particularly after JtL.~e 1966,nnd in spite of the import surge. 
Fears of undesirable monetary repercussions still keep authorities from 
totally eliminating prior deposits; as late as 1968 a plan to eliminate 
those deposits within a year was abandoned for that reason. On the restraining 
side this tool has on occas~_on become the only available instrument capable 
to rapidly stem excessive monetary expansion, as during 1962. 
The effectiveness of prior import deposits in repressing imports is 
relatively weaker than its potency as a monetary tool. The exact opportunity 
cost of the sterilized balances, including the relatively unimportant 
advance payments deposits, expressed as ad-valorem tariff equivalents, is 
difficult to establish exactly, and given capital market imperfections it 
is likely to differ considerably among firms. Some companies may obtain 
foreign suppliers' credits for such purpose (it has even been argued that 
the 1959-60 increases in prior deposits led to an inflow of 11hot money" into 
Colombia), others can obtain credit from their banks, but, particularly 
smaller ones, may suffer severe hardships in raising the needed cash. Colombian 
businessmen, who complain constantly about shortages of working capital, 
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find the prior deposits :particularly obnoxious. Alberto R. Musalem has 
estimated the ad-valorem equivalent incidence of prior import and payments 
deposits at ll percent, on average, for 1960 through 1967.12 For more 
recent years the corresponding figure is smaller, and probably below 5 percent. 
An across-the-board tariff increase of a few percentage points, or a 
slightly faster rate of exchange depreciation seems like small prices to 
pay for the elimination of prior depos:i.ts, whose regressj_ve incidence 
accentuates the concentration of economic power in Colombia. 
Prior import deposits during early 1971 (until. May) went from 1 
to 130 percent ad valorem, As shown in 'rable IV-4, on a.verage i terns in 
the prohibited list bore the highest rates ( as with tariffs) , and on balance 
those in the free list had the lowest rates. As noted when discussing the 
tariff, the tendency to punish 11luxu::.-ies 11 and encourage 11necessities 11 
frequently prevails over the policy of choosing b,~tween alternative, non­
duplicating instruments to restrain imports. The spread in prior deposits 
is somewhat narrcwer than with tariffs, and the ranking by incidence on 
different commodity categories is also slightly different. Capital goods, 
for example, whose tariff rates are roughly in J.ine with those for industrial 
raw materials and semi-ma.~ufactured products, bear much lower prior deposits 
on average. 
As with tariffs, there are many exemptions from prior import deposits, 
including AID-financed imports, those made by the government and public entities, 
some capital goods, imports from LAFTA, most nonreimbursable imports, etc. 
Prior import deposits are regulated by the top monetary authority, the 
,
"Junta Monetarian, presumably in coordination with the "Consejo de Politica 
Aduaneran, which is in charge of the tariff, a.~d with IHCOMEX, which manages 
--
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import controls. In fact, many inconsistencies exist among the use of 
these instruments; for example, there are cases for which the prior deposit 
for inputs is higher than for finished products using those inputs, while 
the tariff situation is more normal. Those cases are reviewed on an ad hoc 
basis, as producers complain of the situation to the nJunta Monetaria11 • 
The Average Exchange Rate Applicable to Merchandise Imports 
By 1971 the exchange rate applied to imports had reached, in real 
terms, its highest sustained postwar II levels, as ca..'1 be seen in Table IV-8 
Its basic single nominal rate had also become unified with those applicable 
to minor exports (excluding CAT), and to capital transactions; minor statistical 
discrepancies show up nowadays only because of timing differences in the 
recorded transactions. As indicated in the third column of Table IV-8, 
the real rate has been also quite stable around a gently rising trend since 
the reforms of March 1967, 
Matters were not always this tranquil and neat. There were times, as 
during the 1956-66 liberalization episode, when two major rates were applied 
to imports: a preferential rate of 9 Pesos per U.S. dollar (the old rate), 
and a new intermediate rate of 13. 50 Pesos, to which gradually all imports 
were transferred, while most private capital transactions took place in an 
uncontrolled free market. Going further back in time, the switch from the 
precarious exchange stability of the mid-1950s, to more realistic levels 
after mid-1957 can be observed also in Table IV-8. 
The crucial hesitations in exchange policy which occurred during 1958-59 
can also be seen in this table. During late 1957 and 1958 a relatively high 
effective import rate was achieved by a fluctuating basic "certificate" 
rate, combined with, for most imports~ a lC percent remittance tax; after 
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Table IV-8 
Average Exchange Rate Applied to ~1erchandise Imports 
Average Effective 
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Table IV--8 (continued) 
1965-1 9.00 7.58 1.56 
-2 9.00 7.34 o.86 
-3 9.37 7.54 1.54 
-4 12.21 9.25 7.21 
1966-1 12.42 9.12 7.50 
-2 12.68 8.88 7.36 
-3 13.13 9.22 7.64 
-4 13.53 9.31 2.21 
1967-1 13.32 9.03 2.61 
-2 13.68 9.12 2.21 
-3 14.34 9.45 2.15 
-4 15.05 9.80 2.83 
1968-1 15.64 10.17 3.03 
-2 15.96 10.14 2.85 
-3 16.26 10.35 2.46 
-4 16.50 10.53 1.97 
1969-1 16. 78 10.68 1.38 
-2 17.02 10.64 1.40 
-3 17.30 10.75 1.14 
-4 17.65 10.78 0,78 
1970-1 17.79 10.92 0.75 
-2 18.08 10.82 o.88 
-3 18.37 11.02 1.09 
-4 19.10 11.28 1.61 
1971-1 
-2 19.38 11.03 
Sources and Method: Average basic rate obtained dividing import peso values 
by import dollar values. The real rate was obtained dividing the basic 
rate by the ratio of Colombian to U.S. wholesale prices. Basic data was taken 
from IMF-IFS. The index of instability of the real rate was computed as in 
Chapter III, i.e., it is defined as the average of the absolute value of 
quarter-to-quarter percentage changes for four consecutive quarters. When the 
index is given for a year, it covers the four quarterly changes during that 
year; when it is given for a quarter, it refers to the percentage changes 
during that quarter plus those · the :preceeding three quarters. 
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March 1958, and until early 1959 that tax had to be paid with U.S. dollars 
-purchased in the fluctuating free market. In January 1959, importers 
were given the option of making payments through the free market, in 
which case they were exempted from the 10 percent remittance tax. In Mey 1959, 
that tax was absorbed, in principle, into customs duties, with the first 
ten percentage points of the duty, insofar ~ applicable, being payable 
in U.S. dollars. The wise de facto flexitiUty which had existed for the 
average effective import rate during 1958 and early 1959 was dead; the basic 
selling certificate rate of 6.4 Pesos, which ahd been reached by October 1958, 
after reaching a high of 6. 8 in June 1958, became after May 1959 the pegged 
effective import rate. This rate was below the effective rates reached during 
1958; even after it was raised to 6.7 Pesos in 1960 it remained substantially 
below the late 1958 de facto levels. 
It is noteworthy that such a return to ''stability" was partly promoted 
by those who after 1967 became champions of the crawling rate. The reasons 
given for the new pegging in 1959 were the usual ones: fear of inflation, 
need for "stability", the impact of a more devalued peso on public and 
private foreign debts denominated in dollars, etc. Naturally, as the ~ 
import exchange rate became eroded from the 1958 levels, increasing use was 
made of prior deposits, tariffs and import controls, until the pressures 
became too great late in 1962. The unfortunate 1962 episode will be reviewed 
in detail later; here it is enough to note that its origins can be traced 
back to the misguided re-pegging of 1959, From the end of 1962 until 
September 1965, the mirage of a stable import rate was again sought; the 
pegged 9 Peso rate was buttressed primarily by tight import controls. 
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Because of the existence of import controls applied with fluctuating 
severity in different periods, there is little systematic link between the 
real effective import exchange rate and actual imports. Correlations between 
percentage changes in imports and in the exchange rate and the stability 
index presented in Table IV-8, similar in structure to the regressions 
presented in Table III-13 for minor exports, yield only insignificant coefficients 
and tiny R21 s, whether the whole 1954-70 period is considered, or it is 
broken up in subperiods. The best result is obtained for 1958 through 1970-2 
for which the t-statistic for the change in the exchange rate variable 
reaches 1.4, with a coefficient ("elasticity
11 
) of -0.37, while the corresponding 
values for the instability index are 1.6 (t-statistic) and 2.02 (coefficient). 
The R
2 is 0.05, with a very low Durbin Watson statistic. 
The bureaucratic bodies officially in charge of establishing exchange 
rate policy have differed from time to time. During the Lleras Restrepo 
administration, the President himself kept a close watch over the exchange 
rat·e. According to Decree-Law 444 of March 1967 (article 21), the "Junta 
, acting through the Central Bank, is charged with regulatingMonetaria11 
the market for foreign exchange. The key personalities in the Junta are 
the Minister of the Treasury and the manager of the Central Bank. The 
certificate rate is typically modified (raised) twice a week, by small 
amounts. 
Table IV-9 presents the monthly changes in the certificate rate since 
the reforms of March 1967. At the start of the new system, the monthly 
changes were fairly irregular, apparently in an attempt to establish the 
principle that this was indeed a fairly unregulated market, and that it 
could even witness an appreciation, as it did during ,January 1968. These 
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Table IV-9 
Percentage Monthly Changes in the Certificate Rate 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Ja."luary 0 -0.13 0 0.39 o.63 0.76 
February 0 0.95 0.59 0.67 0.57 0.71 
March 0.07 0.57 0.71 0.89 0.93 0.89 
April 2.81 0.75 0.18 0.27 0.67 0.75 
May 2.23 0.81 o.47 0.38 o.41 0.74 
June 1.97 0.12 0.58 0.55 0.81 0.74 
July 1.24 0.62 o.46 o.43 0.91 
August 2.39 o.43 0.92 0.54 0.85 
September 1.93 0.73 0.06 0.70 0.74 
October 0.92 0.85 o.4o 0.75 0.79 
November 1.36 o.84 0.51 o.48 o.88 
December 0.70 o.36 0.73 0.74 0.97 
Average 1.73* 0.58 o.47 0.57 0.76 
December to 
December 
Change 16.74 7.11 5.75 7.00 9.53 
*Refers to April through December only. 
Sources and Method: Certificate rate quotations taken at the end of each 
month. Basic data from IMF-IFS. December-to-December changes in Colombian and 
U.S. price indices (averages for the month) have been as follows: 
Colombia U.S. 
Wholesale Consumer Wholesale Consumer 
Prices Prices Prices Prices 
1966-67 5,7 6.5 1.0 2.6 
1967-68 4.9 5.6 2.8 4.5 
1968-69 9.9 12.4 5,5 6.o 
1969-70 6.6 3,5 2.2 5.6 
1970-71 11.5 14.1 3,9 3.3 
Basic data from IMF-IFS. 
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early exchange rate movements were anxiously watched by Colombia's creditors 
and aid-donors, who doubted the firmness of the Colombian commitment to a 
crawling peg; it is said that the slowdown in the rate of depreciation during 
December 1967 and January 1968 caused telegrams to fly between Washington 
and Bogota, and fear was expressed that once the certificate rate reached 
and became unified with the capital market rate (which had been pegged at 
16.3 Pesos since the capital market replaced the free market early in 
TheDecmeber 1966) there would be a return to a fixed 16.3 Peso peg. 
unification point was reached in June 1968, but the upward crawling continued 
although.. not without an unusually low depreciation rate during that month, 
which must have caused a few jitters. But the low depreciation rates of 
June, July and August 1968 apparently had more to do with the visit of 
His Holiness Pope Paul VI to Colombia~ during August 22-24, than with any 
attempt to return to a fixed peg. Similarly, the difficult political 
situation which developed between the election and inauguration of President 
Misael Pastrana Borrero (April-August 1970) seems to account with the slow­
down in the depreciation rate observed for those months. Since the new 
President was inaugurated, the rate of depreciation has become steadier, 
seldom falling outside a 0.6 to 0.9 percent per month range. 
It is not clear how much the demand for import licenses and for 
imports in the free list is influencing the decisions to move the exchange 
rate. It is said that foreign creditors, and in particular the IMF, annually 
agree with Colombian authorities on a minimum target for import registrations 
so as to decrease any temptation which may exist to slowdown the depreciation 
rate and tighten import controls. It is known that authorities also try 
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to keep some sort of link between depreciation and inflation in Colombia 
and abroad, but given the weaknesses of price indices ( and of the rigid 
purchasing power theory), that link is deliberately kept loose. Note, 
however, how the depreciation rate accelerated during 1971 a.Bd 1972 as the 
Colombian inflation picked up. On the whole, it appears that broad depreciation 
targets are set on a yearly basis, depending on expected inflation, imports, 
exchange earnings, etc., and from then on the monthly rate is determined 
"by ear11 So far, the results are good.• 
l 
Footnotes to Chapter IV 
*Besides those thanked in earlier chapters, I would like to aclmowledge the 
help of Richard Cooper and Van Whiting in the preparation of this chapter. 
Consider the following Colombian-like situation: 
Before After a 








Imports 550 500 
To bring about the increase in other exports and the contraction of imports, 
assuming a supply price-elasticity of one for other exports and of about 
-0.45 in the price-elasticity of import demand, a 20% devaluation in the 
non-coffee exchange rate would be required, assuming no increase in home­
good prices. 
2 See Luis Ospina Vasquez, Industria y Proteccion en Colombia, ]810-1930 
(Medellin: E.S.F., 1955) 
3 This paragraph is based on David S.C. Chu~ The Great Depression and 
Industrialization in Latin America: Response to Relative Price Incentives 
in Argentina and Colombia, 1930-45; A Dissertation presented to the Faculty 
of the Graduate School of Yale University in Candidacy for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy, 1972, Chapter 2 and Appendix B-2; and on "The Economic 
Policy of Colombia in 1950-6611 , UNECLA, Economic Bulletin for Latin 11.merica, 
Vol. XII, No. 2, October 1967, especially pp. 90-95. 
,,
4 According to Departamento Administrative de Planeacion y Servicios Tecnicos, 
Plan Decenal de Desarrollo Economico Industrial, 1960-70 (Bogota, n.d.),
= == -- .-· - w = 
Chapter IV. 
IV-2 
5 According to Benjamin I. Cohen, ,;An Analysis of Colombia's Exports 11 
(mimeographed, September 22, 1965), p. 3. Toward the end of 1959, according 
to the data presented in ECLA, 11 Custom duties and other import charges 
and restrictions in Latin .American countries: average levels of incidence 11 
(E/CN .12/554 and Add. 1-11), the arithmetic means ,of customs duties and 
other charges (including the cost of financing prior deposits) in ad-valorem 
equivalents in Colombia were as follows: 
Total 41% 
Unprocessed foodstuffs 68 
Raw materials 31 
Intermediate products 36 
Processed fuels 11 
Capital goods 27 
Processed foodstuffs and tobacco 138 
Chemical and pharmaceutical products 31 
Durable consumer goods 101 
Other consumer goods 57 
6 In his remarkable and influential article i!Protectionism and Industrialization 
in Latin .America1;, Economic Bulletin for Latin Jl.merica, Vol. IX, No. 1, 
March 1964, pp. 61-101. 
7 See David Morawetz 's writings on this subject, particularly "Common External 
Tariff for the Andean Group", mimeographed, 1972. Colombia apparently succeeded 
in obtaining a minimum common tariff close to its own in exchange for going 
along with a common code for direct foreign investment which was tougher 
than it wished. 
8 Other tariff summaries confirm, in general, these conclusions. See in 
particular, Institute para la Integracion de Jl.merica Latina, Banco Interamericano 
de Desarrollo, ainstituciones e Instrumentos de Politica Economica Colombiana 
en Materia de Comercio Exteriorn (mimeographed, November 1968), Table 2; 
and David Morawetz, 11Ha.rmonization of Economic Policies in Customs Unions: 
The .Andean Group!! (mimeographed), December 1971, page lla. 
IV-3 
9 See Richard A. Musgrave, President, and Malcolm Gillis, Editor, Fiscal 
Reform for Colombia: Final Report and Staff Papers of the Colombian 
Commission on Tax Reform (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Law School, 
International Tax Program, 1971), especially Chapters 12 and 13. 
10 See, for example, El Tiempo of September 10, 1971, where it was 
reported that the Executive had asked Congress to eliminate the heavy 
consumption tax on imported cigarettes decreed in Law 19 of December 1970, 
arguing that otherwise smuggling could not be stopped. The Minister of 
the Treasury sensibly argued that 11 ••• public and ostentatious smuggling 
weakens national morality, weakens the prestige of public institut ions, and 
discredits the country in the eyes of foreigners
11 iifational tax revenues• 
from cigarette imports werG running in 1971 sixty percent below those of 
1970, as a result of the higher tax! 
11 In a remarkable move, the Director of Customs called a press conference 
during August 1971 to denounce widespread corruption and inefficiency in the 
nation's customs and harbors, particularly in those of Buenaventura. He 
announced measures to control such ills, but complained that import and 
sales taxes provided very strong stimuli to contraba~d, referring in particular 
to Law 19 of December 1970, whose approval he had opposed. He denounced 
that in the harbor of Buenaventura there were ten known organizations dedicated 
exclusively to stealing goods in transit, often in complicity with public 
employees in customs, the railroad and harbor. Even 80 tons of steel was 
stolen! Such raids are often sponsored by the owners of the merchandise, 
so they can obtain insurance payments as well as new import licenses. See 
El Tiempo, August 26, 1971. 
IV-4 
12 It appears thatMusalem computes the opportunity cost of the idle deposits 
as the rate of inflation plus average yields in the BogotS: Bourse. The 
latter, however, could already make allowances for inflationary expectations, 
in which case the figures overestimate opportunity cost. See Alberto Roque 
Musalem, ,Pinero, Inflacion y Balanza de Pages: La Experiencia de Colombia 
~I_l_J.~_ Po_st=.Gu~:rr.a (Begot~, Colombia: Tall.eres Graficos del Banco de la 
Republica, 1971), page 154. In
' his calculations he also includes the 
opportunity cost of the prior deposits required before the Central Bank hands 
over the necessary foreign exchange to pay for imports. 
